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 Abstract 
A highly complex racial debate preceded the 1898 U.S. annexation of Hawaii, the diverse 
population of which served as a political tool for annexation proponents and opponents alike. 
Annexationists used this ethnic diversity to stress racial difference and the differing degrees of 
assimilability in the Island populace. Through this rhetoric, annexation proponents 
simultaneously emphasized a white supremacy that was expansive, indomitable, and adaptable to 
racial difference—convenient for their economic goal of globalized trade. Contrarily, opponents 
used Island diversity to highlight “inferior” races and defined the entire population by the 
negative stereotypes of singular racial demographics, thus homogenizing the Islands as 
collectively nonwhite and a threat to white America’s wellbeing. Anti-annexationists typically 
framed this opposition in terms of economics, climate, tradition, and disease, constructing a 
white supremacy that was dependent on segregating and preserving the racial homogeneity of the 
white populace. The ultimate results of this debate were two divergent constructions of Hawaiian 
demography and white identity, both politically fashioned to suit the respective party’s broader 
economic goals.   
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For nearly fifty years, U.S. annexation of the Hawaiian Islands stuttered and stalled, 
abandoned amid the Civil War and Reconstruction eras only to be reappraised with the 1893 
overthrow of the Islands. Despite significant opposition and a foundering 1897 treaty, acquisition 
of the Islands was finally fructified in an intensely debated 1898 joint resolution. For decades, 
dreams of breaching oriental markets through Pacific expansion had suffused economic theories, 
and conceptions of sea power as a strategic necessity infatuated military minds with potential 
Pacific outposts. Through the 1898 arrival of the Spanish-American War and its consequent 
nationalist fervor, congressmen suddenly found yet more justification for pursuing a Pacific 
empire. With each passing year, interest in the “Hawaii Question” had amplified, and war with 
Spain flung the Islands into a confluence of economic, militaristic, and social debate integral to 
achieving annexation.  
 Fundamental to this debate was the issue of race. Increasingly reliant on imported 
contract labor, the Hawaiian Islands were one of the most ethnically diverse regions in the sphere 
of nineteenth-century America’s influence.1 Politicians, business magnates, and even the general 
public were acutely conscious of this diverse populace, and they constructed their positions on 
annexation accordingly. Underlying nearly every facet of the debate was a question of race—
would nonwhites be in economic competition with whites? Was the homogenous white ideal of 
                                                          
1 According to the 1896 Hawaiian census report, the Island population totaled 109,020, including 
native Hawaiians, “Part Hawaiians” (“any admixture of Hawaiian blood”), Americans, British, Germans, 
French, Norwegians, Portuguese, Japanese, Chinese, South Sea Islanders, and a small (600 persons in 
total) group of “Other Nationalities.” The report noted that all demographics continued to grow at 
significant rates excepting native Hawaiians, whose numbers continued to drop, though at a diminished 
rate from prior censuses (9.9 percent versus 13.9 in the prior census). It should be noted that this census 
did not account for demographic overlap in children of foreign-born parents; “in assigning nationality that 
of the father [was] always taken,” potentially altering the apparent degree of diversity in nationalities. 
General Superintendent of the Census, Report of the General Superintendent of the Census, 1896 
(Honolulu: Hawaiian Star Press, 1897), 31-34. 
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American identity compatible with racial diversity? What were the implications of nonwhite 
Hawaiian citizenship and suffrage? These were but a few of the racial dilemmas annexation 
posed, and to debate them was to interrogate American racial identity at a fundamental level. 
Annexation thus offers profound insights into 1890s U.S. racial politics, and relegating those 
politics to the periphery of economics and strategy, as many scholars have, hampers a 
comprehensive understanding of the annexation.2  
 Despite its glaring historiographical absence, race’s role in the annexation is being 
increasingly examined. At the forefront of this racial scholarship have been historians like 
Lauren Basson and Eric Love. Basson’s White Enough to Be American? (2008) describes the 
multiracial nature of the Islands as an obstacle to annexation.3 According to Basson, introducing 
the racially, as well as geographically, diverse territory into the U.S. challenged notions of 
American identity that hinged on ethnic homogeneity and contiguous geography. Her 2005 study 
of the post-annexation 1900 Organic Acts debate similarly assessed annexation’s challenges to 
                                                          
2 Few annexation studies address race, and even fewer have it as their subject. Prolific diplomatic 
scholar Merze Tate produced the first strictly race-oriented analysis, though she focused on early 
annexation attempts rather than the Hawaiian Republic period. Pacific historian Thomas Osborne, in his 
1981 analysis of anti-annexationists, did address race; however, he did so only marginally and ultimately 
dismissed it as inconsequential to the debate. Finally, historian Roger Bell’s 1984 monograph, Last 
among Equals, presents a highly intersectional discussion of racial politics, colonialism, and Hawaiian 
statehood—though the majority of his discussion pertains to the post-annexation era rather than the events 
surrounding annexation. See Merze Tate, “Slavery and Racism as Deterrents to the Annexation of 
Hawaii, 1854-1855,” Journal of Negro History 47, no. 1 (January 1962): 1-18; Thomas Osborne, Empire 
Can Wait: American Opposition to Hawaiian Annexation, 1893-1898 (Kent, OH: Kent State University 
Press, 1981); Roger Bell, Last among Equals: Hawaiian Statehood and American Politics (Honolulu, HI: 
University of Hawaii Press, 1984). 
 
3 Lauren Basson, White Enough to Be American? Race Mixing, Indigenous People, and the 
Boundaries of State and Nation (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008). 
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white identity, as well as congressional attempts to limit nonwhite rights.4 The heterogeneity of 
the Hawaiian populace indeed shaped the annexation debate extensively, though Basson does not 
examine the ways in which each party utilized this diversity to its own political advantage. A 
closer examination of the debates demonstrates that ethnic diversity was not solely a political 
obstacle but also a tool; annexation opponents could homogenize the entire population according 
to the stereotypes of individual ethnicities while annexationists emphasized the “whiteness” of 
some races over others—among other equally nuanced uses.  
 This idea of emphasizing whiteness was dissected by race historian Eric Love in his 2004 
book Race over Empire and later essay “White Is the Color of Empire” (2007), both of which 
mark the most in-depth racial studies of the annexation to date.5 Seeking to overturn prevailing 
notions of imperialists as paternalists set on civilizing campaigns, Love argues that 
annexationists “abandoned” their paternalist and assimilationist rhetoric, fearing that white 
benevolence would be politically unpopular in light of the country’s considerable racial 
tensions.6 Instead of noting nonwhite Islanders, asserts Love, expansionists emphasized the white 
descendants of American sugar planters and missionaries on the Islands to define Hawaii in 
exclusively white terms and thus make annexation more acceptable to mainland politics. Love’s 
                                                          
4 Lauren Basson, “Fit for Annexation But Unfit to Vote? Debating Hawaiian Suffrage 
Qualifications at the Turn of the Twentieth Century,” Social Science History 29, no. 4 (Winter 2005): 
575-98. 
 
5 Eric Love, Race over Empire: Racism and U.S. Imperialism, 1865-1900 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina, 2004); Eric Love, “White Is the Color of Empire: The Annexation of 
Hawaii in 1898,” in Race, Nation, and Empire in American History, ed. James Campbell, Matthew 
Guterl, and Robert Lee (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 75-102. 
 
6 Love, Race over Empire, 119-20. 
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scholarship traces the annexation from pre-revolution Hawaii to the Spanish-American War, and 
his research on racial politics is invaluable.  
Despite being a powerful thesis, however, it is misdirected. Far from having “abandoned 
the rhetoric of racial uplift, Christian mission, the ‘white man’s Burden,’ benevolent 
assimilation, and any other language that placed nonwhites at the center of their initiatives,” 
annexationists consistently used the rhetoric of paternalism and civilization in discussions of 
Hawaii.7 The Spanish-American War, which Love argues affected little in the congressional 
racial calculus, was regularly trumpeted as an opportunity to protect Pacific races; if 
expansionists were truly fearful of emphasizing diversity, why would they make it such a 
prominent tactic of their war promotion? Love’s thesis, while complicating the more generalized 
narrative of imperialism, dismisses the inherent complexity of white supremacy and racial 
politics. Constructing whiteness was one of many annexationist racial tactics rather than the 
overarching political strategy that Love asserts it to be—one of several points this research hopes 
to demonstrate.  
From these as well as other studies, several points can be synthesized regarding 
annexation. First, historians Merze Tate and Thomas Osborne have provided more than enough 
evidence that the root of annexation politics was economic.8 In the years leading up to 
annexation, expansionists vigorously sought a Pacific pathway to lucrative Asian markets, while 
                                                          
7 Love, Race over Empire, 120.  
 
8 Osborne, Empire Can Wait; Merze Tate, Hawaii: Reciprocity or Annexation (East Lansing: 
Michigan State University Press, 1968). Equally valuable to understanding the extensive history of U.S.-
Hawaii relations is Tate’s earlier monograph, which, though problematic in its apologetic depictions of 
U.S. imperialism, remains an invaluable work of Pacific diplomatic and political history. See The United 
States and the Hawaiian Kingdom: A Political History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965). 
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opponents warned of a path toward imperialism deleterious to domestic interests.9 This 
opposition was composed of primarily Democrats and a small sect of dissident Republicans, 
who, while favoring market expansion, resisted the global scale many expansionists proposed.10 
Nascent notions of imperial sea power and social Darwinism, as described by historian Julius 
Pratt, offered strategic and social arguments conducive to this larger economic impetus.11 The 
onset of the 1898 Spanish-American War, itself predicated on many of these ideas, only hastened 
annexation through the rhetoric of nationalism and patriotism, as demonstrated by diplomatic 
historian Thomas Bailey’s trendsetting research.12 Additionally, Noenoe Silva’s groundbreaking 
analysis of Hawaiian language sources describes native Hawaiians’ prominent roles in opposing 
annexation, both on the Islands and the mainland, and their significant impact on the Hawaiian 
and American annexation discourse.13 Finally, Basson’s and Love’s aforementioned scholarship 
                                                          
9 Osborne, Empire Can Wait, 122-30. Osborne also notes that annexation opponents “did not 
come close to envisioning the extensive commercial empire” of McKinley expansionists, and while they 
“favored commercial prosperity[,] few . . . were militant trade expansionists” (102). 
 
10 According to historian Robert Beisner, Democratic congressmen were generally opposed “to 
the expansionism of McKinley’s Republican administration”; however, their overall support for the anti-
imperialism movement was tepid and politically tactical. Osborne further describes this expansionist 
ambivalence, asserting that while Senate Democrats were initially supportive of annexation in 1893, those 
in the House were vocally opposed. President-elect Grover Cleveland’s opposition to the 1893 annexation 
treaty stifled this early Democratic Senate support. The 1898 partisan divide was similar, and, overall, 
Republicans appear to have had the most party unity, rallying behind expansion. Robert Beisner, Twelve 
Against Empire: The Anti-Imperialists, 1898-1900 (New York: McGraw Hill, 1968), xii. Osborne, 
Empire Can Wait, 4-8. 
  
11 Julius Pratt, Expansionists of 1898: The Acquisition of Hawaii and the Spanish Islands 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1936). 
 
12 Thomas Bailey, “The United States and Hawaii during the Spanish-American War,” American 
Historical Review 36, no. 3 (April 1931): 552-60.  
 
13 Noenoe Silva, Aloha Betrayed: Native Hawaiian Resistance to American Colonialism 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004). Fluent in Hawaiian, Silva authored the first analysis of 
native Hawaiian resistance movements and sources such as the 1897 anti-annexation petition, signed by 
more than 21,000 Hawaiians. Silva’s scholarship marks an important shift in annexation historiography, 
drawing attention to the intense opposition of native Hawaiians to annexation and criticizing earlier 
scholars like Ralph Kuykendall and William Russ for marginalizing native resistance movements. Silva 
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adeptly evinces how congressmen filtered all of these concerns through a politically conscious 
racial lens, acutely aware of Hawaii’s diverse population and its political implications.  
Such complexity produced racial politics significantly more intricate than this literature 
reveals, however. Hawaii’s diversity allowed annexationists to stress racial heterogeneity and 
differing degrees of assimilability in the Island populace. Proponents could then highlight the 
white minority and tout the assimilability of “semi-civilized” groups like native Hawaiians while 
simultaneously emphasizing the racial threat of a Japanese invasion. Paternalism was thus 
presented in a way that preserved American Yellow Peril prejudices and stressed white interests. 
Annexationists expressed this heterogeneous racial ideology through arguments of paternalism 
and strategy, and in doing so defined a white supremacy that was expansive, indomitable, and 
adaptable to racial difference—convenient for their economic goal of globalized trade.  
In contrast, opponents used Island diversity to highlight “inferior” races and defined the 
entire population by the negative stereotypes of those specific racial groups. This approach 
effectively homogenized the Islands as collectively nonwhite and a threat to white America’s 
institutions and supremacy. Such xenophobic othering was both politically viable and integral to 
anti-imperialist economics that stressed defending domestic manufacturers. Anti-annexationists 
typically framed this racial opposition in terms of economics, climate, tradition, and disease, 
constructing a white supremacy that was dependent on segregating and preserving the racial 
homogeneity of the white populace. The ultimate results of this debate were two divergent 
                                                          
argues that “the lack of historical reference to such a large and organized resistance is typical of colonial 
situations, in which the archive in the language of the colonizer is privileged to a high degree over that of 
the vernacular,” and the only way to truly examine annexation is to engage with the thus-far underutilized 
Hawaiian sources. Silva, 125. For the primary subjects of Silva’s historiographical criticism, see also 
Ralph S. Kuykendall, The Hawaiian Kingdom: Volumes 1-3 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 
1938-67); William Russ, The Hawaiian Republic (1894-98) and Its Struggle to Win Annexation 
(Selinsgrove, PA: Susquehanna University Press, 1961).  
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constructions of Hawaiian demography and white identity, both politically fashioned to suit the 
respective party’s broader economic goals.  
A core tenet of annexationist thought was exemplified in an 1898 meeting of the Sunset 
Club, an intellectual symposium for Chicago’s prominent businessmen.14 On a winter evening in 
early February at the Palmer House Hotel, the Club conducted its eighty-eight meeting. The topic 
was “the very interesting and timely subject” of Hawaii’s annexation to the U.S.15 This was no 
ordinary annexation discussion, however; in his preliminary remarks, Club Secretary Howard 
Smith noted, with awe, that the chairman for the evening would be “a native” of the Islands. “I 
must say,” the secretary began, “the chairman . . . did not meet my ideas of what a native of the 
Sandwich Islands was.” He continued, chronicling how their peculiar “brother left his savage 
home amid the plantains and the palm trees” and “plung[ed] with great success” into the 
commerce of Chicago, a “center of progress and culture,” and having “abjured all heathen 
practices” adopted the language and cultural accoutrements of a civilized business professional. 
Concluding his remarks, the secretary implored his audience to “disclose to [their] acquisitive 
gaze one of the natives of the Sandwich Islands,” as he introduced Chicago Title and Trust 
Company president David B. Lyman.16 
                                                          
14 Ultimately disbanded in 1901, the Club was formed in 1889 purportedly “to foster rational 
good-fellowship and tolerant discussion” among prominent male Chicagoans such as lawyers and 
entrepreneurs. J. Seymour Currey, Chicago: Its History and Its Builders; A Century of Marvelous Growth 
(Chicago: S. J. Clarke Publishing, 1912), 1: 182. 
 
15 Howard Smith, The Sunset Club, 1898-99: The Meetings of 1898-99 and a List of Members to 
September, 1899 (Chicago: Sunset Club, 1899), 39.  
 
16 Smith, Sunset Club, 39-40. The secretary hedged on the “heathen” remark, qualifying “at least 
so far as was necessary to permit him to engage in the practice of law” (40). 
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Lyman jested that in the Chicago climate he was “obliged to forego short skirts” before 
recounting a Hawaiian history celebratory of sea-faring Europeans and Americans. According to 
Lyman, these industrious immigrants “christianized” and “civilized” the “little speck right in the 
center of that entire [Southern Pacific] ocean,” Hawaii. Ever diffident, the speaker conceded, “I 
am a simple barbarian.”17 Though an amusing narrative, Lyman’s claims were not altogether 
true. In fact, David Brainerd Lyman was the son of David Beldman Lyman, an American 
missionary to Hawaii. His mother was Sarah Joiner, born in Vermont. Indeed, Lyman was born 
in Hawaii, but he was far from the indigenous “barbarian” that he and his audience assessed him 
as. He was part of the white American missionary and planter class, a group Queen Liliuokalani 
condemned as “pseudo-Hawaiians” for marginalizing native Islanders and falsely claiming 
indigeneity to promote annexation.18 In the secretary’s introduction, he noted that “much of the 
argument for and against annexation hinge[d] upon the character of the natives.”19 He hoped that 
Lyman’s appearance would put that question to rest: as would be seen, Lyman and the natives 
were, in every stretch of the word, white. 
The Sunset Club’s meeting embodies a popular annexationist tactic of inventing 
whiteness and asserting fraternity with the white Island minority, a racial tool well-analyzed by 
historian Eric Love. In the halls of Congress, and—as suggested above—throughout America, 
                                                          
17 Smith, Sunset Club, 40-42. 
 
18 Liliuokalani, Hawaii’s Story by Hawaii’s Queen (Boston: Lothrop, Lee, and Shepard, 1898), 
325. By Liliuokalani’s time, the white missionary and planter class had profoundly influenced Hawaii, 
having reshaped legislative, racial, and economic politics on the Islands to best suit white business 
interests. For an extensive accounting of white Americans’ expanding political and economic influence on 
the Islands, see Jonathan Osorio, Dismembering Lahui: A History of the Hawaiian Nation to 1887 
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002). 
 
19 Smith, Sunset Club, 39. 
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annexationists sought to emphasize the white presence in Hawaii to refute opposition arguments 
that the Island populace was “inferior,” incapable of assimilation, and detrimental to white 
American society. As Love has shown, congressmen often diminished the presence of nonwhites 
on the Islands by inflating numbers of white Americans and Europeans as well as frequently 
counting the Portuguese population as white to construct an Anglicized Hawaii.20 Multiple 
mainland annexationists spoke in fraternal terms of their white Hawaiian counterparts and 
asserted that few if any nonwhites existed on the Islands.21 Some went so far as to claim that 
those few who did reside there would inevitably face “extirpation” by whites or die off 
regardless.22 By promoting a white man as the face of native Hawaii, organizations like the 
Sunset Club thus made a compelling argument for racial solidarity and annexation. 
However, while Lyman’s presence reflected one tactic, his rhetoric evinced another. 
Throughout his narration and later exchanges with fellow attendees, Lyman asserted another 
major annexationist talking point—that, when provided the proper environment, Hawaiians were 
so fundamentally assimilable to white culture as to become nearly indistinguishable from 
                                                          
20 Love, Race over Empire, 146; Love, “White Is the Color of Empire,” 90. 
 
21 Love, Race over Empire, 152; Love, “White Is the Color of Empire,” 95. According to Love, 
“white racial brotherhood became a vital leitmotif of pro-resolution debate.” 
 
22 Marion De Vries, Hawaiian Annexation: Speech of Hon. Marion De Vries, of California, in the 
House of Representatives (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1898), 17. De Vries elaborated that “the 
experiences of mankind demonstrate that all inferior races decimate and become extinguished before the 
march of Anglo Saxon civilization and laws. The annexation of Hawaii, with the Chinese exclusion 
condition quoted, means the extirpation from Hawaii of the Chinese, Japanese, and Hawaiians now 
competing in open market with our laborers. The invasion by Anglo-Saxons following annexation of 
these islands so guarantees” (17). Notions of whitening Hawaii through ethnic cleansing were frequent, as 
seen in the comments of Representative Charles Pearce that white intermarriage would increase “mixed 
Hawaiian stock” and decrease “natives of full Hawaiian blood.” See Charles E. Pearce, Annexation of 
Hawaii: “Westward the Course of Empire Takes its Sway”; Speech of Hon. Charles E. Pearce, of 
Missouri, in the House of Representatives (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1898), 15.  
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“civilized” white Americans.23 Integral to annexationist politics was the idea that Islanders, while 
inferior, were capable of development. At an annexationist address to the Grafton and Coös Bar 
Association, former representative and influential politician Harry Bingham described native 
Hawaiians as having “a peaceable, law-abiding disposition” and as “educated and intelligent.”24 
The Hawaiian Commission, an 1898 annexationist congressional committee tasked with 
investigating annexation prospects, similarly described native Hawaiians as “a kindly 
affectionate people, confiding, friendly, and liberal,” and emphasized their willingness “to 
associate and intermarry with the European or other races.”25 Annexationists did not seek solely 
to whiten Hawaii, but also to perpetuate a stereotype of “peaceable” and “affectionate” 
Hawaiians naturally predisposed to adopt the superior white culture.  
This innate predisposition was not enough for civility, however. To annexationists, 
Hawaiian racial development could be cultivated only by a white overseer, trimming the errant 
weeds of incivility and barbarism destined to entrap the Hawaiian at any moment. Former 
Minister to Hawaii John Stevens, architect of America’s role in the 1893 coup and inexhaustible 
annexationist, while complementing Hawaiians as “good debater[s]” and “fluent talker[s],” 
warned that they were “just the material . . . to fall prey to demagogic arts” and presently risked 
                                                          
23 Smith, Sunset Club, 41. Silva has described the haole, or non-native Hawaiians like Lyman, as 
“sons of the missionaries who were determined to eradicate Kanaka culture because it was savage, dark, 
and inferior” and who were “imbued from birth with a sense of their own superiority to the natives; their 
parents and grandparents had come to Hawaii in order to bring enlightenment and civilization.” Lyman’s 
story, with its indigenous erasure and themes of white civilization, thus reflects a larger racial narrative 
endemic in the nineteenth-century white missionary culture. See Silva, Aloha Betrayed, 126. 
 
24 Harry Bingham, The Annexation of Hawaii: A Right and a Duty (Concord, NH: Rumford Press, 
1898), 16; Bingham, The Annexation of Hawaii, 10. 
 
25 Hawaiian Commission, The Report of the Hawaiian Commission (Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, 1898), 3. 
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“a drift back to barbarism.”26 In his popular Picturesque Hawaii (1894), Stevens crafted a history 
of Hawaiians as violent pagans subject to alcoholism and corruption without the guiding hand of 
white government officials and missionaries.27 In an extended romanticized description, Stevens 
fully embraced the theme of white cultivation, proclaiming the “Anglo-Saxon” as the “author” of 
Hawaii and the cultivator of its tropical flora, including the “rubber tree,” “baobuab,” “avocado,” 
“mango,” and even palm trees.28 “Most people . . . do not know that when the white man came, 
Honolulu was a treeless, sandy plain . . . . Honolulu . . . is the creation of the foreigner,” asserted 
Stevens, who claimed this fruitful paradise to be evidence “of the beneficent transformations that 
. . . foreigners [have] effected in Hawaii.”29 To Stevens, Hawaiian progress required whites. 
Like Stevens, annexationists regularly reminisced on the industry of white immigrants, 
particularly missionaries, who, in the words of Representative Albert Berry, “found [Hawaiians] 
in an almost barbarous condition and set to bring about a condition of civilization.”30 By virtue 
                                                          
26 John Stevens and William B. Oleson, Picturesque Hawaii: A Charming Description of Her 
Unique History, Strange People, Exquisite Climate, Wondrous Volcanoes, Luxurious Productions, 
Beautiful Cities, Corrupt Monarchy, Recent Revolution and Provisional Government (Philadelphia: 
Hubbard Publishing, 1894), 14-26. 
 
27 Stevens said the Hawaiian “religious instincts may carry him to extremes from modern 
Christianity to a resuscitated heathenism, and he may not be able himself to tell where he belongs at 
times. He needs a rudder to guide him in these respects, as in many others.” Stevens and Oleson, 
Picturesque Hawaii, 29. To stress what this barbarism would entail, Stevens described violent, 
“grotesque,” and likely exaggerated customs prevalent before the civilizing arrival of missionaries, such 
as when “a little child had her eye scooped out for daring to taste a banana.” Stevens and Olseon, 
Picturesque Hawaii, 3. 
 
28 Stevens and Olseon, Picturesque Hawaii, 50. 
 
29 Stevens and Olseon, Picturesque Hawaii, 50. 
 
30 Albert Berry, Proposed Annexation of the Hawaiian Republic: Speech of Hon. Albert S. Berry, 
of Kentucky, in the House of Representatives (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1898), 4. 
Republican Representative Edwin Burleigh similarly described how “American missionaries reclaimed 
their [Hawaii’s] natives from barbarism” in his advocacy for annexation. Edwin Burleigh, Annexation of 
Hawaii: Speech of Hon. Edwin C. Burleigh, of Maine, in the House of Representatives (Washington, DC: 
Library of Congress, 1898), 5. 
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of Hawaii’s diverse populace, annexationists could emphasize the presence and role of whites 
throughout Hawaiian history. In doing so, they constructed a paternalist narrative that gradually 
evolved into white obligation to assist “struggling races.”31  
While historians like Love dismiss the role of the “white man’s burden” and paternalism 
on Hawaiian annexation politics, examples abound of annexationists describing their nation as a 
father obliged to nurture and uplift his Hawaiian children. The aforementioned Hawaii 
Commission referred to natives as “childlike,” and Bingham similarly spoke of Hawaii’s 
relationship with the U.S. as “like a child to its father.”32 Popular political cartoons in magazines 
like Puck regularly infantilized depictions of the Islands, personifying the nation as a wailing 
dark-skinned infant, obstinate schoolchild, and other demeaning caricatures always juxtaposed 
with a fatherly, and very white, Uncle Sam.33 Republican Representative George Ray phrased it 
thusly: “It is the mission of the United States to elevate, educate, and ennoble . . . all the peoples 
of the earth,” situating annexation in a larger narrative of “uplifting . . . the human race.”34 To 
annexation proponents, Hawaiians had an inherent potential for assimilation and civil virtue, and 
                                                          
31 Galusha Grow, Annexation of the Hawaiian Islands: Speech of Hon. Galusha A. Grow of 
Pennsylvania, in the House of Representatives (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1898), 5. 
 
32 Hawaiian Commission, Report of the Hawaiian Commission, 3; Bingham, The Annexation of 
Hawaii, 7. 
 
33 See, for example, Udo Keppler’s “A Trifle Embarrassed,” depicting manifest destiny delivering 
an infantile Hawaii, among other territories, to the “U.S. Foundling Asylum.” It is one of many of 
Keppler’s expansionism cartoons to include a childlike Hawaii. Keppler, “A Trifle Embarrassed,” Library 
of Congress Prints and Photographs Division, accessed April 6, 2020, http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/ 
2012647587/. Interestingly, Silva notes that political caricatures of Queen Liliuokalani and Hawaiians 
were often based on preexisting stereotypical black caricatures, and cartoonists thus used existing 
prejudices against black people to convey similar racist notions regarding Hawaiians. This racist model 
was recycled even further in popular cartoon depictions of Filipinos during the 1898 Philippine-American 
War. See Silva, Aloha Betrayed, 176-78. 
 
34 George W. Ray, Annexation of Hawaii: Speech of Hon. George W. Ray of New York in the 
House of Representatives (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1898), 4. 
Hearl 13 
their current success and stability were the products of a white population nurturing that 
potential. For annexationists, then, to abandon Hawaii was akin to abandoning a child. 
Not everyone on the Islands was fit for assimilation, however. Annexationists were 
keenly aware of American labor’s animus toward Asians, a vehemence fostered from years of 
Chinese immigration perceived by American workers as depressing wages and threatening their 
jobs.35 The significant Asian population on the Islands thus threatened many Americans and was 
an ever-occurring racial talking point of annexation opponents. To make their annexation 
arguments politically acceptable, proponents excluded Chinese and Japanese citizens from their 
assimilation rhetoric, using the ethnic diversity of Hawaii to delineate between racially tolerable 
and intolerable ethnic groups.  
Republican Representative Jacob Bromwell, for example, simultaneously described “the 
inhabitants of Hawaii” as “desirable” and likely to “become homogeneous” with whites while 
denigrating the “undesirable class of Asiatics.”36 Representative Albert Berry asserted that 
Hawaiians were “honest” and “not . . . savages,” but assured fellow legislators that “the 
Chinaman, when he gets together a few hundred dollars, will go back to die in the happy Land of 
the Sun from which he came.”37 Native Hawaiians, Portuguese, and other races denominated as 
not white by annexationists were regularly classed in different terms and levels of assimilability 
separate from Asians, who most condemned and claimed would promptly leave the Islands.  
                                                          
35 Matthew F. Jacobson, “Annexing the Other: The World’s Peoples as Auxiliary Consumers and 
Imported Workers, 1876-1917,” in Race, Nation, and Empire in American History, ed. James Campbell, 
Matthew Guterl, and Robert Lee (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 120-24. 
 
36 Jacob Bromwell, Remarks of Hon. J. H. Bromwell, of Ohio, on Hawaiian Annexation, in the 
House of Representatives (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1898), 11.  
 
37 Berry, Proposed Annexation of the Hawaiian Republic, 12-13. 
Hearl 14 
Anti-Asian sentiments were not just rhetorical. The joint resolution excluded the existing 
Chinese population from immigrating to the U.S., and it stipulated that restrictions on further 
Asian immigration to the Islands would also accompany annexation.38 These measures were 
undoubtedly added to avoid contravening the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act, but they were also to 
appease popular xenophobia toward Asians. Incorporating Asian prejudice into annexation 
swayed at least one congressman’s vote, with Representative Albert Todd contending that, were 
Asian citizens not excluded from annexation, he would “oppose the measure with all [his] 
power.”39 While annexation opponents would use Hawaii’s ethnic diversity to highlight an 
undesirable Asian populace, annexationists frequently used it to minimize Asians in favor of 
other races. This racial heterogeneity thus allowed annexationists to promote racial paternalism 
without challenging popular prejudice.  
At the same time, annexationists were relying on a perception of white supremacy as 
expansive and racial superiority as immutable and intrinsic to the individual. Wherever white 
Americans traveled, according to proponents like Minister Stevens, industry and civilization 
followed, and the white minority on the Islands served as a testament to the civilizing nature of 
whites. Native Hawaiians and their fellow “inferior” races possessed the racial aptitude for 
civilization and political participation so long as they were under the watchful eye of a white 
presence. This appeal to white superiority was strengthened by fictitious constructions of a 
predominantly white Hawaii and claims of indigeneity by white men like David Lyman. The 
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conception of an expanding and insurmountable white supremacy was crucial to furthering 
paternalist arguments and integral to annexationists’ broader goal of expanding trade. Proponents 
of annexation could thus couch that economic goal in the language of white civilization and 
racial uplift while utilizing a diverse population to navigate anti-Asian politics.  
Such themes of racial uplift and indomitable white supremacy often led annexationists to 
situate Hawaii in a larger narrative of white global conquest. Representative Henry Gibson 
prefaced his speech on the joint resolution with a meandering summary of the “hardy and 
adventurous race . . . known as the Vikings,” whose “spirit of adventure” led them westward in 
conquest.40 According to Gibson, “the English descendants of [those] Vikings” colonized the 
U.S., and with “the spirit . . . still raging in their breasts,” they traversed and conquered the West, 
now setting their sights upon “the whole boundless ocean.”41 Gibson perceived Hawaiian 
annexation as the natural progress of white civilization into the Pacific and a necessary step for 
attaining global white supremacy. 
Gibson was not alone in his supremacist assessment. In a Chicago Daily Tribune article 
titled “Vantage in Hawaii,” U.S. Civil Service Commission Chair John Proctor trumpeted the 
“potency” of white Americans’ “propensity to acquire land” and the “colonizing instincts . . . 
inherited from [their] sea-roving ancestors.” He continued: 
The English-speaking peoples . . . have advanced more in material wealth during 
the century now closing than in all the previous centuries in the history of our race 
. . . . [O]ur race has the means of unlimited expansion without imperiling national 
unity.42 
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Proctor, like Gibson, situated annexation in a narrative of white conquest. Historian Julius Pratt 
has stressed how the supremacist mentalities of social Darwinism and manifest destiny had a 
considerable influence on annexationist policy, and such expansionist notions of white 
supremacy were crucial in conveying annexationists’ larger policy of economic expansion.43 By 
fitting Hawaii into this racial grand narrative, annexation proponents like Proctor and Gibson 
could not only defend its acquisition but also inspire solidarity and racial pride among white 
Americans. 
 The presence of missionaries on the Islands inevitably led to religious interpretations of 
this racial triumphalism. Representative Galusha Grow, for example, perceived annexation as 
“part of the plans of Divine Providence” leading toward “[t]he millennium, long promised” and 
preached of the “lightenings of heaven” and the arrival of a “vigorous race.”44 Grow argued on 
“behalf of struggling races” and condemned past President Grover Cleveland’s failed plan to 
restore the monarchy as “kiss[ing] the extended hand of [Hawaii’s] dusky Queen” and “recreant 
to liberty.”45 Representative William Mesick similarly characterized the U.S. as “under the 
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45 Grow, Annexation of the Hawaiian Islands, 5. President Cleveland staunchly opposed 
annexation and supported Liliuokalani’s restoration, characterizing the provisional government as owing 
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Congress.” James H. Blount, Foreign Relations of the U.S., 1894: Affairs in Hawaii. Report of U.S. 
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guidance of Divine Providence,” while Representative Jacob Bromwell touted “the progress of 
[Hawaii] from a state of paganism to the highest plane of Christian civilization.”46 These 
religious interpretations of expansion and racial paternalism were bolstered by the arrival of war 
with Spain, which congressmen characterized as a “holy war” in which annexation was a 
necessity.47   
Annexationists thus saw white supremacy, and therefore Pacific expansion, as naturally 
and divinely ordained, and the Hawaiian Islands were an important step in the realization of 
Christian white supremacy. Requisite for this supremacy was military dominance. By 
strengthening military influence and strategic capabilities, the U.S. could ensure the protection of 
racial and commercial supremacy. Naval Officer and historian Alfred Thayer Mahan’s 
hagiography of naval power in The Influence of Sea Power upon History (1890) had a profound 
influence on this strategic debate. 48 Mahan understood international relations in highly 
competitive terms, characterized by self-interested nations locked in a tumultuous struggle for 
economic and strategic hegemony. International dominance in this contested sphere depended on 
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economic production, the preservation of which was inextricably linked to sea power. By 
ensuring a continual domestic production of goods, protecting and exporting those goods with an 
insuperable navy, and colonizing regions to extract and export additional resources, a nation 
could attain international authority, according to Mahan.49  
An incapable navy thus hindered commercial expansion and protection to the advantage 
of global competitors. Mahan’s thesis prompted international efforts at naval expansion, 
dominating the military thought of Americans, Europeans, and the Japanese, whose naval policy 
was even “more Mahanian than America’s,” according to naval specialist George Baer.50 
However, Mahan asserted that naval expansion offered few if any benefits without concomitant 
territorial growth. To truly utilize a navy required strategic overseas outposts; these would not 
only offer overseas markets for domestic overproduction but also be invaluable in refueling, 
coordinating, and deploying naval vessels. Mahan explicitly linked this theory to the U.S., 
writing, “Having . . . no foreign establishments, either colonial or military, the ships of war of the 
United States . . . will be like land birds, unable to fly far from their own shores.”51 By Mahan’s 
logic, U.S. hegemony thus necessitated commercial, naval, and territorial expansion.  
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The Influence of Sea Power shifted the gaze of America’s military to the Pacific, and 
annexationists clamored for Hawaii as a stepping stone in creating a Pacific military hegemony. 
Mahan swiftly endorsed annexation as well, opining in an 1893 article in Forum that Hawaii was 
valuable for commercial and military security.52 By 1897, newspapers and popular media were 
emphatic in their support of annexation as a strategic necessity, and the arrival of the Spanish-
American War would only heighten this rhetoric.53 Accordingly, nearly all proponents for 
annexation cited military advisers, generals, and naval experts during the joint resolution 
debates, promoting Hawaii as a Pacific panacea for naval power.54 
 In these strategic arguments, Hawaii’s racial diversity would once again play a key role. 
A recent “rapid increase” in Japan’s navy made the nation strategically suspect to many 
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proponents of annexation.55 Beginning in the 1870s, Japan had pursued policies of significant 
naval expansion, incited in part by rising tensions with China culminating in the Sino-Japanese 
War of 1894-95.56 As noted, Mahan’s 1890 thesis offered further impetus to Japanese naval 
expansionists as well. Compounding this naval concern was Japan’s extended history of 
economic relations with Hawaii; by 1893, Japanese contract laborers composed nearly 40 
percent of the Islands’ population.57 Numerous annexationists used this Japanese presence to 
incite fears of a villainous Japanese government seeking to annex the archipelago.58 According to 
Representative Horace Packer, a rejection of annexation would lead to “many thousand more 
Japanese . . . invad[ing] the islands” who would then “gain the supremacy.” “The interests of 
Japan . . . in the Pacific will continue to increase,” Packer warned, and there was “danger in 
delay.”59 Former Representative Bingham concocted a theory of Japan sending “her people to 
emigrate in great numbers to Hawaii” to “obtai[n] . . . control” in a “repugnant” scheme.60 
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Bingham described a conniving “Japan, emerging from semi-barbarism and in the morning 
twilight of her civilization, peering across the vast water of the Pacific” toward Hawaii.61 While 
Japan indeed had Pacific interests—mostly in Hawaiian debt—such a conspiracy was highly 
unlikely; however, the growing Japanese population provided a politically valuable specter of 
Asian threat.62 
 Likewise, former Secretary of State John Foster warned of the “danger of Asiatic 
ascendency,” citing a steady increase in the number of both Chinese and Japanese populations 
creating “a source of great anxiety.”63 Unlike supposedly passive native Hawaiians, the Japanese 
were “inclined to be turbulent,” and were “a brave people, with military instincts” who “would 
fight if aroused to violence”—a racial characterization clearly influenced by the recent Sino-
Japanese War.64 Foster’s inclusion of Chinese with Japanese populations, while grossly ironic 
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considering the war, was a step in creating a broader narrative of a white West versus an Asian 
East—a Yellow Peril-infused cultural war for which Hawaii was the proxy. As early as 1894, 
Minister Stevens had questioned “whether Anglo-Saxon civilization should protect itself against 
threatened submergence” by an “invasion” of “Asiatics” on the Islands.65 This war had religious 
connotations as well; to many Americans, Asians were “pagans and idolaters” who threatened 
the Christianization and assimilation of native Hawaiians.66 
 The diversity of the Hawaiian Islands thus allowed annexationists to pit various races 
against one another—Christianized native Hawaiians against Asian pagans, and whites against 
Japanese—in a narrative that appealed to Yellow Peril prejudice and depicted Hawaii as a 
microcosm of a global struggle between East and West. This narrative was easily integrated into 
arguments of strategic and military exigency, and philosophies like Mahan’s provided strategic 
and historical justifications, especially as war with Spain drew nearer. Japan’s recent naval 
expansions, particularly in light of the Sino-Japanese War, exacerbated American fears of an 
Asian menace, however fictitious they may have been. The resulting argument thus appealed to 
overlapping notions of race, religion, and nationalism, all of which aided in solidifying support 
for annexation. 
Crucial to promoting these ideas were the previous notions of assimilation and 
paternalism. By singling out native Hawaiians as racial inferiors dependent on the cultural 
enrichment of white Americans, annexationists could establish a relationship between global 
supremacy and a Pacific paternalist project. The white population on the Islands only enhanced 
this argument by giving supposed evidence of benevolent white influence and allowing 
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expansionists to create racial solidarity with Island whites. In the debate on annexation, David 
Lyman, John Stevens, John Proctor, and their congressional allies thus emphasized the 
heterogeneity of the Islands and promoted notions of white superiority as expansive. The result 
was a politically nuanced and intersectional racial ideology easily adaptable to a variety of 
political talking points and vital to promoting economic global hegemony. Opponents, however, 
came to radically different racial conclusions. 
Domestic economic policy was the chief political lodestar directing annexation 
opposition. The 1896 National Democratic Party platform, for example, emphasized the “home 
market” and “home manufactories,” rejected an “importation of foreign pauper labor,” and 
argued for the “protection of American labor,” making domestic economic policy a rallying cry 
that would shape much of the opposition’s debate on annexation.67 Expansionist talking points of 
Asian trade held little sway among political leaders and constituents who favored domestic over 
global markets, and Hawaii’s incorporation into the U.S. was antipodal to these interests on 
several fronts. Especially problematic was the production capacity of Hawaiian sugar 
manufacturers.  
Sugar was one of several commodities affected by the oscillatory tariff policies of the 
1880s and 1890s. From 1879 to 1889, duties levied on sugar fluctuated from 45% to 70%, were 
eliminated in 1890 with the passage of the McKinley Tariff, were reinstated by the 1894 Wilson-
Gorman Tariff, and had increased to 76% by 1899.68 These policy shifts were tied to shifts in 
political power; as protectionist Republicans raised tariffs, free trade Democrats deflated them, 
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and as political control alternated between the two, so too did economic policy.69 Tariffs were an 
important source of revenue—comprising nearly 40–60% of all federal revenue in the decades 
between 1870 and 1900—and a means of protecting domestic manufacturers from foreign 
competition.70 As such, tariffs were of immense consequence and highly politicized, and sugar 
refiners in the Midwest and Louisiana followed these fluctuations with great concern, especially 
as they related to the imported cane sugar of Hawaiian competitors. 
The 1875 Reciprocity Treaty with the Islands permitted duty-free U.S. importation of 
sugar—and thus some degree of competition. Particularly galling for domestic producers had 
been sudden investments in Hawaiian plantations by sugar magnates like the oft-vilified Claus 
Spreckels, who bought half of the yearly sugar crop and thousands of acres of plantation land 
following the treaty.71 Yet annexation would fully domesticate Pacific sugar in a manner that 
could lead to “the absolute destruction of the [Western U.S.] sugar industry.”72 Dorman Eaton, 
famed municipal reformer and former member of the U.S. Civil Service Commission, warned in 
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a series of pamphlets that Hawaiian sugar would “ente[r] the only (local) markets on which 
producers of domestic sugar [could] safely rely.”73 While local beet and cane sugar refineries had 
weathered reciprocity, complete annexation could provoke a domestic disaster. This domestic 
concern easily translated into race politics, however.  
In a vociferous attack on annexation, Eaton wrote, “Let us protect our own farmers . . . 
and our own labor and our own taxpayers,” asserting that “American capital” was best “at 
home.”74 To many Americans, local sugar producers and sugar beet farmers in regions like the 
Midwest and Louisiana were being forsaken for the gain of scheming “sugar kings” propelled by 
Hawaiian contract labor.75 The ethnic demographics of this labor were highly diverse; for 
decades, Island sugar planters had racially calculated labor contracts to achieve peak diversity, 
believing that racial difference would stymie labor solidarity and thus limit the potential for 
revolts.76 Many of these contracted laborers hailed from Asian nations, allowing anti-
annexationists to harness existing anti-Asian labor sentiments to vilify the economic effects of 
annexation. Exemplifying this method was Arizona territorial delegate Marcus Aurelius Smith, 
who homogenized the population and preyed on existing fears of Chinese job-stealers, 
condemning the “Chinese or other alien cheap labor, dominated as they will always be by some 
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enormous combine or trust.”77 Warning that “the very floodgates of China would be opened 
upon us through Hawaii,” the delegate stoked fears of not only labor competition, but nonwhite 
labor competition.78 
Smith, an obstreperous advocate for Arizona statehood and vehement racist—he once 
remarked on the appeal of funding “slaughterhouses” for Native Americans—gave an 
exceptionally powerful economic speech opposing annexation.79 Although his speech focused 
heavily on demanding Arizona statehood—“Arizona is more entitled to home rule than these 
Japs and Chinese are to annexation,” he exclaimed—the delegate’s words aptly demonstrate how 
annexation opponents racially articulated domestic economics.80 Invoking the 1882 Chinese 
Exclusion Act, Smith argued that the U.S. had “spent vast sums in keeping them [the Chinese] 
out,” yet annexation would allow “25,000 Chinese” to be “free to leave the cheap wages of 
Hawaii . . . and directly compete with our educated labor.”81  
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Anti-annexationists feared nonwhite competition partly because of its socially demeaning 
aspects—as Louisiana Representative Robert Broussard asserted, “competition was to be . . . 
white man competing against white man”—but also because nonwhites were perceived as more 
subservient and acclimated to labor, making them more productive and less expensive than 
whites.82 This argument was often supported by climate-related rhetoric, as congressmen like 
Representative James Richardson of Tennessee warned of the “cheap cooly [sic] labor of the 
tropical colonies,” and Indiana Representative Edgar Crumpacker asserted that “white labor 
never has gone . . . and . . . never will go” to “tropical countries.”83 Annexation would force 
whites into unfair competition with Islanders climatically and racially capable of manual labor 
on a scale incomparable to whites.  
Through this racial interpretation of labor, anti-annexationists like Smith, Richardson, 
and Crumpacker placed limits on white superiority. Although nonwhite Islanders were seen as 
cultural and biological inferiors of white Americans, their inferiority did not ensure white 
superiority in all situations, such as in economic competition. As such, white economic 
supremacy required “white man competing against white man,” or a homogenous labor force, 
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and the introduction of nonwhite laborers would drive down wages and force out whites, 
threatening that supremacy.84 Whereas annexationists perceived white supremacy as capable of 
withstanding—or even destined to create—economic and labor expansion, annexation opponents 
feared the opposite, believing that the wider white influence spread the less secure it could be. 
That a partly Asian populace posed this threat only heightened fear and animosity. 
All the more insulting to anti-annexationists was the economic benefit going to nonwhites 
rather than supposedly deserving whites. “I live in the West, and I love it and its people,” 
Delegate Smith said. “Their hope and mine is to see it grow and flourish, as it will with half the 
help your course now offers to the foreign hordes. . . .”85 The 1897 letter of a New Brunswick 
“old south sea trader” to the New York Times similarly complained that annexation would 
“enrich a handful of half-breeds” rather than deserving white Americans.86 Notably, by annexing 
Hawaii, the U.S. government was not only benefitting the Island’s sugar industries, but also 
assuming Hawaiian debts totaling almost four million dollars—over 124 million dollars in 
today’s currency.87 Many anti-annexationists lambasted these economic consequences for 
prioritizing nonwhites over whites. As Delegate Smith said, white civilization would “flourish” 
with “half the help” necessary for nonwhites, and thus it was only logical that such an investment 
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as annexation would be better directed toward white Americans.88 It was in these arguments that 
opponents most tended to homogenize the Islanders and rely heavily on the language of “ours,” 
“us,” and “them,” emphasizing a xenophobic narrative of nonwhite gains at the expense of white 
power. 
While legitimate nonracial economic issues complicated annexation, much of the 
opposition’s economic rhetoric was articulated in overtly racial terms. Anti-annexationists like 
Arizona Delegate Marcus Smith utilized the Asian population on the Islands to harness existing 
white fears of Asians stealing jobs and driving down wages, as well as to accentuate threats to 
white economic supremacy. Many opponents of the joint resolution homogenized the diverse 
ethnic groups on the archipelago, reducing them to simply nonwhite “hordes,” and emphasized 
the social disorder and perceived unfairness of whites competing with nonwhites. In doing so, 
anti-annexationists stressed a version of white superiority and supremacy incompatible with 
Pacific economic expansion, using racism and xenophobia to augment their domestic-focused 
economic policies—largely across states and regions, though especially in those with sugar 
interests like the Midwest and Louisiana. This was not the only seemingly nonracial argument 
that opponents would racialize, however. 
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 Also central to many anti-annexationist positions were the topics of climate and, to a 
lesser extent, topography and geography. Hawaii’s climate was exceptionally tropical; indeed, 
much of the travel adverts and popular literature of the time swooned over sunlit shores and 
sabulous reverie, romanticizing the Islands as tropical bastions of leisure and exotica. The 
terrain, often mountainous, also featured towering volcanoes. Such qualities were not only 
advantageous for tourist agencies but anti-annexationists as well, who ridiculed the terrain and 
climate as devoid of agricultural—and thus economic—value. “The interior of the islands is 
devoted to raising volcanoes,” mused one sardonic senator amid debate of the joint resolution.89 
Likewise, Representative Richardson negatively remarked on the Islands’ “rough, barren, [and] 
mountainous lands.”90 Hawaii’s landscape would prove a valuable political tool for annexation 
opponents, though questions of agricultural potential were not the crux of their climatic 
arguments; the tropical and arid climate could offer fodder for racial rhetoric as well.  
 Although being slowly supplanted by novel ideas of biological racism, eighteenth-
century notions of climate as racially determinist remained a prominent element of the 
nineteenth-century racial discourse. The “climate science” theory dictated that the climate in 
which one lived determined their complexion, physicality, and intellectual capacity; tropical 
sweltering climes, in the words of Representative Crumpacker, “stifl[ed] growth and imped[ed] 
progress in the individual, and . . . society.”91 Populist Representative John Bell’s comments on 
annexation provide the most succinct illustration of popular views: 
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 [T]here is not a case in history where this [white] civilization has thrived 
under a tropical sun. The American civilization, the European civilization, is an 
incarnation of the temperate climate. It can not exist anywhere else. The African 
in Africa has lived through the centuries, but that torrid sun has never allowed the 
front brain to develop. He might live there until doomsday and he never could 
invent an alphabet, . . . a multiplication table, . . . an arithmetic, and he could 
never adopt a republican . . . government. The scientists have told us that since the 
dawn of civilization there has been a government suitable for every clime.92  
 
Bell continued, elaborating on the correlation between temperateness and “where the front brain 
develops.” Bell’s remarks were not uncommon, and they demonstrate the overwhelming 
influence climate science had on the Hawaii debate. To anti-annexationists, whiteness and white 
superiority were scientifically predicated on a temperate climate.93 This assertion entailed two 
conclusions: anyone, regardless of race, living in the intemperate portions of Hawaii would be 
incapable of civility and American republicanism, and, more importantly, the climate rendered it 
impossible for whites to exert a civilizing or assimilatory influence upon Islanders without 
risking their own degradation—undercutting a major racial argument of annexationists.  
 Both conclusions were amply used by annexation opponents. Representative John 
Shafroth noted, for example, that “the Hawaiian . . . islands [were] located in a latitude south of 
the Tropic of Cancer” and that “something in the climate of the torrid zone . . . saps the energies . 
. . and prevents that development so essential to good and enlightened citizenship of a 
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republic.”94 Senator Richard Pettigrew, combining a historical argument with one of climate, 
asserted that while the U.S. was traditionally expansionist, the territories gained were always 
“within the temperate zone,” territories “which possessed climate, soil, and . . . people capable of 
governing themselves.”95 To these congressmen, the heat of Hawaii rendered its races a liability 
for U.S. institutions. The potential for a civilizing white presence, as expansionists attested to, 
was equally infeasible; according to Bell, white Americans were “a product of a temperate 
climate” and could not be moved “beyond the latitude of 55° or within 30° of the equator and 
maintain the high caste that pervades [their] homogeneous population.” The idea of 
“Americanizing” such tropical locales was “a mere dream” and nothing more, he asserted.96  
 This conception of climate thus led to anti-annexationists adopting a differing 
construction of white supremacy and superiority than did expansionists. Whereas annexationists 
perceived whiteness as an overwhelming and indomitable force of acculturation predestined to 
uplift “lesser” races, opponents constructed an exclusive and fragile supremacy which hinged on 
precarious environmental characteristics rather than those inherent to the individual. Not only did 
they construct differing definitions of whiteness, however. Anti-annexationists also constructed 
differing perceptions of Hawaii itself. To ensure the validity of their climatic argument, anti-
annexationists created a climatically and topographically homogenous Hawaii, much as they did 
with race. Although some, like Bell, conceded that “in Hawaii . . . you can get every climate that 
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is known to mankind,” most opponents of annexation spoke in sweeping generalities, painting a 
picture of little more than sweltering crags and barren sands.97 This rhetorical choice was 
important; despite having eight differing islands, all regions of the anti-annexationists’ Hawaii 
were climatically and geographically identical, and thus all people—as racial products of their 
environment—were as well. This idea further instilled a notion of all nonwhites as identical, 
helping to further “other” Hawaii and its inhabitants from white Americans—an integral point of 
anti-imperialists’ xenophobic arguments.98 
 Expansionists could offer little to counter climate science. The Report of the Hawaii 
Commission, for example, admitted that “the question whether white labor can be profitably 
utilized . . . is yet a problem,” though they claimed that “some” planters thought it would “prove 
superior” to Asian labor.99 The most prominent defense was celebrating the climate and terrain 
as fertile and economically productive. Representative John Barham lauded the “earthly 
paradise” and “perpetual summer,” claiming that “the climate [was] almost perfect” on the 
Islands.100 Similarly, Representative Charles Henry spoke fancifully of “beautiful lakes and 
sparkling rivers,” with a “climate so pleasant that it is not injurious to anyone and is admired by 
all; with soil productive far beyond the conception” of Americans.101 When anti-annexationists 
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questioned the racial impact of the climate, expansionists hurriedly changed the subject to 
romantic exoticism and agricultural profit, seeking to pivot to their more viable economic 
arguments. 
Thus expansionists and anti-expansionists crafted two different constructions of Hawaii. 
Again, Hawaii’s diversity, of climate and topography in this instance, allowed anti-
annexationists to emphasize one characteristic over others, creating homogenized views of the 
inhabitants and an exclusionary white supremacy, the influence of which was limited by climate 
and region. This rhetorical technique was integral to perpetuating anti-annexation themes of “us 
versus them” and xenophobia, eliminating any possible similarities between the U.S. and Hawaii. 
Expansionist refutations, unable to completely denounce climate science, used tropical 
characteristics to change the subject and highlight their economic positions.  
American tradition, whether diplomatic, expansionist, or political, proved yet another 
means of arguing against annexation. These arguments often entailed particular 
conceptualizations of American identity—as continentally confined, racially homogenous, and 
white—and they were foundational to major anti-imperialist talking points. Constitutional 
questions of rights and citizenship, or whether constitutional rights may “follow the flag” to 
annexed territories, were central to how congressmen judged whether annexation aligned with 
traditions of territorial expansion and republican government. The U.S.’s historical role, or lack 
thereof, in international diplomacy offered other means of assessing American traditions as well. 
A thorough analysis of anti-annexationists’ rhetoric reveals that they viewed U.S. tradition and 
history in fundamentally racial terms and used Hawaii’s ethnic diversity to warn of a nation on 
the precipice of forsaking its identity. In the process, they further limited the expanse of white 
supremacy from its economic and climatic limitations. 
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The Monroe Doctrine, as well as the less-mentioned Tyler Doctrine, implied protection 
rather than expansion to annexation opponents.102 According to anti-annexationists, these 
doctrines were part of an international diplomatic framework disjunctive from westward 
continental expansion, and Hawaiian annexation conflated the two, derailing the U.S. from its 
traditional path of diplomacy. These were genuine nonracial arguments, and they embody the 
major constitutional, doctrinal, and philosophical disputes characterizing the annexation 
debate.103 However, anti-annexationist congressmen often proposed racial justifications for these 
issues. The racial logic governing westward expansion, according to many opponents, was that 
western and southwestern territories were predominantly white; Texas, New Mexico, and 
California were “northern provinces” of Mexico peopled with a “very scanty Mexican 
population.”104 According to Representative Adolph Meyer, for example, the U.S. “left to 
Mexico all those portions of her country which were well populated by her own people.”105 
Despite its political authority, the white population in Hawaii was marginal—as Meyer noted, 
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the Islands were “filled up and running over with Kanakas and Asiatics”—and therefore 
annexation constituted a break with traditional expansionist doctrines that emphasized an 
existing white populace.106 
Expanding into areas of nonwhite populations did not just redefine traditional doctrines 
of expansion; it also threatened U.S. traditions of white homogenous identity. Early historian 
Hermann von Holst, a staunch anti-annexationist whose language was frequently echoed on the 
congressional debate floor, argued in an address to the Chicago Commercial Club that racial 
“homogeneity . . . must be deemed indispensable” and that the necessary “degree of 
homogeneity” was entirely absent on the Islands.107 Senator Shelby Cullom similarly explained 
that Hawaiians were of “mixed races and from different countries,” rendering them “a different 
class of people” atypical of homogenous white identity.108 Notably, race historian Lauren Basson 
has asserted that American perceptions of traditional identity as white and homogenous were 
integral to annexation opposition; to anti-annexationists, the U.S. was a nation based on white 
racial purity, and the “curious conglomeration” of which Hawaii was composed was antithetical 
to that ethnic identity.109  
The rhetoric of heterogeneity was articulated most often through enumerating the 
nationalities in the 1896 Hawaiian census, which evinced an exceptionally diverse populace 
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totaling about 109,000 people.110 Almost all annexation opponents invoked the document in what 
became a highly contrived ethnic itemization guaranteed to appear at some point in their laments. 
Senator John Mitchell honed this talking point to political performance art, delivering an 
extensive and exhaustively derogatory enumeration of Hawaiian ethnic groups, concluding that 
annexationists wished “to swallow at a gulp this variegated agglomeration of the fag-ends of 
humanity.”111 Mitchell’s assertions, while particularly verbose, were not atypical of anti-
annexation talking points; congressmen regularly maligned the population as “mongrel” and 
“conglomerate.”112 Yet again, Hawaii’s racial diversity, cultivated by decades of contract labor, 
proved to be a valuable political tool in providing annexation opponents an ethnic antipode to 
homogenous white identity.  
This approach should not be conflated with the racial delimiting that annexationists 
pursued. Despite bearing a superficial resemblance to annexationists’ emphases on diversity, 
opposition rhetoric differed fundamentally. Opponents defined Hawaii as populated with 
different races, but, unlike annexationists, did not discriminate between those races; they were 
simply collectively nonwhite or mixed-race. Representative Champ Clark, for example, 
denounced the Islands’ diversity yet simultaneously homogenized the entire population as “non-
descript asiatico Polynesian ignoramuses.”113 Representative Richard Bland delineated between 
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the various races, but ultimately accounted “a total population of 101, 818 that may be 
denominated as an inferior race,” demonstrating that while Hawaii was racially diverse, those 
races were fundamentally the same to anti-annexationists.114 This qualification was important, as 
emphasizing diversity potentially introduced addressing the white population on the Islands—
something problematic to anti-annexationist talking points of barbaric homogenous Islanders. 
Paradoxically, anti-annexationists managed to homogenize heterogeneity, attributing stereotypes 
of singular ethnic groups to the heterogeneous whole.  
This tactic was valuable to broader assertions that annexation would produce a domino 
effect of Pacific land acquisition in a “policy that would not end.”115 Hawaii’s noncontiguous 
geography embodied a fundamental break with continental expansion and, to anti-annexationists, 
foreshadowed a redefinition of manifest destiny to include island nations, like the Philippines, 
Cuba, and the Fiji Islands. Many feared an American attempt at European colonialism unlikely to 
be satiated solely with the Hawaiian Islands.116 Mahan’s aforementioned colonialist urgings did 
little to assuage such fears. Hawaii’s island identity thus implied island solidarity to many 
annexation opponents, who regularly invoked stereotypes of other islands during discussions of 
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Hawaii. Most typical were the Philippines, the population of which Representative John Rixey 
claimed were “little more than savages.”117 Representative John Shafroth, for example, dedicated 
much of his discussion of Hawaiians to also condemning Filipinos, alternating between the two 
as though they were synonymous.118 The Philippines, however, were not the sole subject of 
Hawaii-fueled offense. Representative Clark passionately warned the House Speaker: 
[Y]ou will be called upon to recognize the gentleman from Patagonia, the 
gentleman from Cuba, the gentleman from Porto Rico, the gentleman from 
Greenland, the gentleman from Fiji, and, with fear and trembling, the gentleman 
from the Cannibal Islands, as he gazes with gleaming eyes and glistening teeth 
upon your imposing and tempting self.119 
 
As Representative Clark’s warning shows, Hawaii’s ethnic diversity, coupled with its island 
identity, allowed opponents to denounce races not even present on the Islands in their Hawaii 
debate. By asserting that Hawaii’s lack of contiguity would engender future island expansion, 
anti-annexationists could incorporate other islands into their discussion and equate them to 
Hawaii within a broader argument of traditional continental expansion. 
Clark’s cannibal congressman reveals another threat that annexation introduced: the 
erosion of republican political traditions. This dilemma was of two parts. First, to annex the 
Hawaiian Islands and not extend civil rights and representation to the population would, in the 
words of Representative Shafroth, “violate the very principle for which our fathers fought the 
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Revolutionary War” and “overturn the guaranty of the Constitution.”120 Representative Meyer, 
emphasizing the political traditions of “state rights, local self-government, and individual 
freedom,” similarly stated that to not extend those notions to the “inferior and mongrel races” of 
Hawaii would mean abandoning the “grand American system of free government with limited 
powers.”121  
At the core of this conversation was whether the constitution, in contemporary parlance, 
“followed the flag,” raising troubling questions about the degree to which annexed territories, 
and their largely nonwhite populations, would be incorporated into the U.S. and bestowed 
constitutional rights.122 Representative Bland, for example, asserting that the U.S. Constitution 
“provides that no citizen of the United States shall be disfranchised on account of race, color, or 
previous condition of servitude,” questioned, “When Hawaii becomes a part of . . . the United 
States, what shall be said as to the legal status of these 39,000 natives? May they not claim the 
right of citizenship, because the territory would then be a part of the United States? They would 
also be natives of that part of the United States.”123 This constitutional quandary prefigured the 
early twentieth-century Insular Cases, a series of Supreme Court cases judging the extent to 
                                                          
120 Shafroth, An Imperial Policy Dangerous to the Republic, 7-8. 
 
121 Meyer, Annexation of the Hawaiian Islands, 15. 
 
122 Representative Richardson, for instance, noted that expansionists “say commerce follows the 
flag,” but questioned whether statehood, citizenship, and rights of self-governance did as well, asking, “Is 
[Hawaii] to become a State of the American Union? . . . If it is not to become a State, what then shall we 
do with it? Shall it be held permanently as a Territory? Will it be contended that the inhabitants of those 
islands can govern themselves by and through a Territorial legislature?” Anything otherwise “would be 
utterly and entirely in contravention of [U.S.] laws and institutions, which are rooted and grounded on the 
principles of equality and self-government.” During Richardson’s remarks, Representative Bland agreed, 
commenting, “The constitution makes every native of that island a citizen.” Richardson, Hawaiian 
Annexation and Our Foreign Policy, 9-11.  
 
123 Bland, Proposed Annexation of Hawaii, 11. 
 
Hearl 41 
which the Constitution provided for Spanish-American War acquisitions. While the Court 
ultimately ruled that the full application of constitutional rights depended on whether a territory 
was incorporated, the issue was far from settled in 1898.124  
Most anti-expansionists held that the Constitution applied ex proprio vigore, meaning 
that full rights were extended the instant that sovereignty was transferred between a territory and 
the U.S.125 This notion was based on precedents of prior acquisitions that by design were on the 
path to statehood—as Representative Robert Broussard stated, “Territorial possession . . . 
heretofore has only been the probationary stage to Statehood.”126 While expansionists at the 
close of the Spanish-American War would argue differently—asserting that recent acquisitions 
were results of war and thus in a constitutionally liminal state—most during the Hawaii debate 
agreed with their opponents; Hawaiians were to receive constitutional rights and citizenship, 
excepting the Chinese populace as per the existing Exclusion Act.127 To do otherwise would 
challenge constitutional precedents of territorial expansion.128 
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To all parties, then, preserving American political values required extending them to a 
diverse nonwhite populace. This expectation led to the second contention of anti-
annexationists—that permitting nonwhites to participate in a historically white government 
would ensure its collapse. Representative Bland asserted that Hawaiians were not “equals in any 
sense of the word” and were “wholly incapable” of comprehending republican government—yet 
by that government, “they [were] entitled to freedom.”129 Echoing other congressmen, he further 
questioned if extending suffrage to “the native inferior race” would not “place the whole 
Government in [their] hands . . . beyond hope of redemption?”130 The Islanders’ inferiority 
rendered them inept participants in the white realm of republicanism, and their mere corruptive 
presence could “impair true American institutions,” regardless of their minority status.131 To 
anti-annexationists, a “free and happy” government “must be a white man’s government.”132 Any 
breach, however small, in racial homogeneity wrought a vitiating, if not altogether ruinous, 
effect on political institutions and threatened white supremacy. White political supremacy 
required white participation, and if congressmen truly expected to uphold their constitutional and 
territorial traditions, they would be forced to undercut that supremacy through the injurious 
participation of nonwhites.133 
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133 Interestingly, Senator John Morgan, a leader of the annexation movement, visited Hawaii in 
hopes of convincing native Hawaiians to support annexation, asserting that their civil rights and 
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Thus, even in their own climate, even economically competing against their own race, if 
white Americans introduced Islanders into their traditionally white political institutions, they still 
risked degradation. Senator Mitchell likened the annexation to a Trojan horse, calling Hawaiians 
a “permanent menace” to U.S. government.134 Representative Crumpacker attested that while he 
loved “to look upon my fellow-citizen with the consciousness that . . . he is the equal before the 
law” and will produce “a posterity that will bless humanity and glorify republican institutions,” 
Hawaiians could not “keep pace . . . in [the] march to a higher destiny” and would “lower the 
dignity of our own citizenship.”135 With annexation, “mongrels” and “cannibals” would 
inevitably claim the very seats in which these legislators sat, lowering the dignity of both the 
political office and the citizenry. Within these notions of republican tradition and historically 
white institutions, annexation opponents thus insinuated an inherently limited white superiority 
dependent on racial exclusion. As with climate and economics, whites were capable of political 
supremacy only when their polity was homogenous and white.  
As in previous talking points, anti-annexationists thus posited a white supremacy with 
stipulations; whites had to maintain racial segregation and political omnipotence to maintain 
racial supremacy. Nonwhites were not assimilable to whiteness, but detractors from it. Such a 
defensive construction of whiteness was integral to opposing U.S. expansion into the Pacific. 
Furthermore, the ethnic diversity of the Islands served as a political counterpoint to traditional 
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white notions of homogenous American identity. However, unlike expansionists, anti-
annexationists utilized that heterogeneity in an inherently homogenizing way, viewing all Island 
races as collectively inferior and indistinguishable—generalizing stereotypes across all ethnic 
groups. This political use of Island diversity, combined with an exclusionary white supremacy 
predicated on political, doctrinal, and expansionist traditions, allowed anti-annexationists to once 
more manipulate racial ideology to condemn policies of Pacific expansion.  
The annexation debate was not just about who would be brought into the country, but 
what those people would be bringing with them as well. Racial conceptions of disease were 
especially endemic in anti-annexationist rhetoric, and both congressmen and the media 
repeatedly defined the nonwhite Hawaiian population as disease-ridden vectors hostile to white 
health. The association of race with disease was not a recent one, as both Native Americans and 
African Americans had been historically evaluated as immunologically inferior to whites; 
however, this Hawaiian variant had roots largely in anti-Asian xenophobia.136 Nineteenth-
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century notions of biological inferiority and earlier determinist conceptions of climate led whites 
to perceive Asians not only as intellectually inferior and societally stagnant but incapable of 
comprehending white notions of cleanliness and health.137 Biological understandings of race 
produced the idea of immunological inferiority as well: Asians were highly susceptible to 
disease, both due to their physiologically degenerative states and rice-based, rather than protein-
rich, diets. Bodily aesthetics, like perceptions of Asians as sallow and sickly in complexion, 
further bolstered this theory.138 Nineteenth-century Americans combined these racial beliefs with 
epidemiological evidence of disease in Asian populations to argue that Asians were virulent 
threats to white civilization—an argument easily and potently coupled with existing anti-Chinese 
labor rhetoric.  
The preponderance of Asian immigration, particularly of Chinese, to the West Coast 
transformed these abstract fears into tangible threats, and the dilapidated living conditions of 
many urban Chinese workers exacerbated stereotypes of disease and filth, ultimately prompting 
legislation like the Chinese Exclusion Act.139 Once again, the racial diversity of the Hawaiian 
Islands would prove useful to anti-annexationists. By homogenizing the Island populace in 
relation to its Asian residents, congressmen could associate these popular Asian disease 
stereotypes with everyone on the Islands. Representative James Richardson, for example, 
lamented the “diseased conditions” of Hawaiian immigrants and noted that “the fatal plague 
which unhappily afflicts [the Islands] . . . forbid[s] their general occupation . . . by our 
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people.”140 The press espoused this contagious conviction as well, with newspapers like the 
Philadelphia Record decrying the act of “tak[ing] in at one gulp the whole mass of diseased and 
depraved serfs” populating the archipelago.141  
The existence of a leper colony on Molokai Island strengthened this argument even more. 
An 1897 article in the North American Review by prominent dermatologist and sexual disease 
expert Prince Morrow asserted that an analysis of Hawaiian leprosy was vital to the annexation 
debate. “The sanitary aspects of the scheme have received no attention,” wrote Morrow, and “it 
becomes a serious question as to what will be the effect of the absorption of this tainted 
population upon the health interests of this country.”142 Morrow linked the presence of leprosy to 
early Chinese immigration to the Islands and blamed the disease for the decline in native 
populations, claiming that leprosy was “slowly sapping the life-blood of the Hawaiian 
people.”143 This issue concerned Morrow little, however, as “the Hawaiian is essentially insular 
to his tastes and habits” and was unlikely to immigrate to the U.S.; what was more problematic 
were “lepers . . . in their desire to escape Molokai” fleeing into the country.144 Overall, the 
“principal danger would come from the establishment of more intimate commercial relations” 
encouraging Americans to travel to the Islands only to make “contact with the tainted 
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population.”145 Although Morrow ultimately considered the temperate climate of North America 
as “exert[ing] a marked inhibitory influence” on the disease, he cautioned that leprosy was 
“insidious,” and that Hawaii should be contemplated “from a sanitary point of view” prior to 
annexing the Islands’ “leprous population.”146  
Immediately, leprosy became the definitive Islander disease in annexation debates. 
Senator John Mitchell quoted Morrow at length in a long-winded virulently racist speech, 
warning of “some fourteen hundred lepers—doomed beings, who have shut to themselves the 
doors of their own sepulcher.”147 Not content with only Morrow’s testimony, Mitchell quoted 
author Robert Louis Stevenson’s account of visiting a Hawaiian leper colony, describing 
“abominable deformations of our common manhood,” a “horror of delirium,” and “the butt ends 
of human beings lying . . . almost unrecognizable” and concluding that the island was “a pitiful 
place to visit and a hell to dwell in.”148 “Here one breathes the atmosphere of affliction, disease, 
and physical disgrace,” Mitchell quoted, later admonishing the government as “significantly 
silent” on the matter of leprosy.149 The senator was not alone in his fears; Representative John 
Rixey warned that “many of the population of the Hawaiian Islands are afflicted with leprosy,” 
and Representative Richard Bland, lacking the time to speak critically “about leprosy and 
lepers,” noted that “no intelligent man here can be deceived as to the population of the Hawaiian 
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Islands.”150 The Mississippi Natchez Daily Democrat went so far as to call the Islanders “the 
most leprous people on earth.”151 The anti-annexationists’ point was clear—to annex Hawaiians 
was to annex lepers. 
The peak of this concern arrived during the speech of Representative John Gaines, an 
anti-annexation Democrat well-studied in medicine. Reviling the Islands as “stricken with 
leprosy since 1856” and characterizing their populace as “the refuse of all creation,” Gaines 
combined the rhetoric of leprosy with political concerns to foretell a diseased and dreadful 
American future: 
This is the mass, the refuse of all creation, that will soon be knocking at the doors 
of Congress for statehood, that two Senators, leprous suspects, and two 
Representatives, leprous suspects, may be elected and sit in Congress to make 
laws for this country and that unfortunate people.152 
 
Gaines’s medical background likely made such perils of leprous legislators all the more 
impactful to his congressional colleagues, who throughout the debate referred to the general 
Hawaiian populace as lepers and diseased.  
This approach was politically effective. A risk of Hawaiian disease provided a tangible 
threat to Americans already familiar with stereotypes of Asiatic contagions like plague and 
leprosy, and the ethnic diversity of the Islands allowed anti-annexationists to define them by 
their Asian population. Thus, annexation opponents could cast Hawaii in Asian and diseased 
terms to exploit existing popular prejudices. Additionally, this technique allowed opponents to 
circumvent questions of white superiority—while white Americans would undoubtedly be 
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superior to the Hawaiian races, superiority did not ensure immunity to disease. As such, 
infectious immigrants could potentially destroy domestic white supremacy, and a white civilizing 
presence on the Islands would likely not withstand the Hawaiian diseases, effectively nullifying 
expansionists’ paternalist talking points.  
Annexationist attempts to refute the above claims were often limited because invoking 
the idea of leprosy would only emphasize it further. Regardless of population, disease 
transmission, or susceptibility, lepers were on the Islands, and so the best approach for 
annexationists was to ignore rather than refute the argument. For example, the Hawaii 
Commission limited their report’s discussion of leprosy to a two-page section titled “Leper 
Settlement.” In four introductory and unusually pithy sentences, the section notes a presence of 
“1,100 lepers” who were “fed, clothed, and cared for by the Government of Hawaii.”153 A dense 
and absurdly unrelated digression follows—still part of the leper analysis—offering idyllic 
scenes of “great crops of sugar,” natives’ skills at crafting mats, “lofty mountains,” the 
“efflorescence of sulphur [sic]” from a “subterranean fountain,” and one monumental summit—
the “magnitude” of which “is hardly believed at first sight.”154 The Commission’s closing 
comment in “Leper Settlement” aptly illustrates their approach to the leprosy question: “There is 
much timber land also found on the mountain sides.”155  
Not all annexationists, however, eluded and obfuscated questions of archipelagic disease. 
Walter Frear, in his “Report of Committee on Health and Quarantine,” lauded the Honolulu 
Board of Health as having “a commodious quarantine station with a modern disinfecting plant” 
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that was “so efficient . . . that bubonic plague has never, cholera but one, and smallpox only a 
few times” troubled the Islands, while also blaming a “serious danger of introduction of 
epidemic diseases” on Chinese and Japanese ports.156 He went on to describe the segregation of 
lepers, arguing that the number of afflicted would “diminish until it becomes nil” and 
emphasizing Hawaii’s “stricter enforcement of [leper] segregation.”157 Similarly, Representative 
Albert Berry argued, “The [Hawaiian] race is gradually becoming extinct,” and the “great 
bugaboo” of leprosy would die with them.158 Emphasizing containment and decline was not the 
only approach. Conversely, Minister Stevens extolled the “liberal treatment of lepers” as 
exemplary of native Hawaiians’ Christian goodwill and emblematic of how easily assimilated to 
white culture native Hawaiians were.159 Still, these responses were rarities in the larger 
annexationist discussion, and invoking leprosy was typically avoided unless absolutely 
necessary, such as in analyses of health and sanitation. 
Not only did anti-annexationists propagate fears of literal diseases like leprosy, but they 
also used disease-based rhetoric to refer to nonwhites, homogenizing them and characterizing 
them as both disease-carriers and a disease themselves. The aforementioned Arizona delegate 
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Marcus Smith, after listing the multiethnic census record, condemned “taking into our body 
politic the virus here.”160 Representative Edgar Crumpacker asserted, “The infusion of that exotic 
into our national currents will . . . corrupt our whole system; it will be a festering sore in the 
body politic, to irritate and annoy for all time.”161 During his anti-annexationist address to the 
Chicago Commercial Club, Hermann von Holst relied on similar rhetoric, asserting that to annex 
the Islands was to “consciously insert into the nation’s lifeblood a foreign body which cannot be 
assimilated.”162 To anti-annexationists, the Hawaiian population was not just contagious but a 
contagion, and it was one that endangered the health of white America’s institutions and identity.  
For annexationists, this method proved even more difficult to defeat than tangible fears of 
leprosy and plague. Characterizing Islanders as a disease infecting the white body politic shifted 
the race conversation into abstract rhetoric, and the only viable means of refutation was to shift 
to the equally abstract assimilation arguments noted previously. Unfortunately, arguing that 
nonwhites would assimilate rather than metaphorically infect fell apart when confronted with the 
idea of literal disease. Whether assimilated or not, if Islanders carried disease, the U.S. was at 
risk. In racial conceptions of disease—and diseased conceptions of race—anti-annexationists 
thus found a talking point nigh-impossible for annexationists to refute.  
Furthermore, these rhetorical strategies could both feed off of and reinforce popular fears 
of immigrant-born infection, acting in a reciprocal manner to strengthen domestic xenophobia. 
The multiethnic nature of Hawaii allowed annexation opponents to harness existing anti-Asian 
disease stereotypes and define the entire population with the prejudices of a single demographic. 
                                                          
160 Smith, Speeches, 13. 
 
161 Crumpacker, Annexation of the Hawaiian Islands, 5. 
 
162 von Holst, The Annexation of Hawaii, 27. 
Hearl 52 
This politically adroit use of race offered yet another limit to white supremacy as well, without 
necessarily questioning white superiority. Through the racial rhetoric of disease, anti-
annexationists once again utilized Hawaiian heterogeneity to craft politically nuanced and 
exclusionary conceptions of white supremacy and racial identity.  
  Clearly, the Hawaii Question of the 1890s was far from a simple one; the debate was 
highly intersectional, including topics of economics, strategy, environment, tradition, and even 
medicine. Linking these seemingly disparate discussions was the theme of race, and both 
supporters and opponents of annexation racially manipulated the Islands in ways advantageous to 
their greater economic goals. A diverse populace allowed proponents to draw boundaries 
between races and promote assimilation while simultaneously harnessing prejudice—in the 
process perpetuating a conception of white supremacy as expansive and indomitable. Opponents 
sought instead to generalize Island races and relied on diversity to apply racial stereotypes across 
ethnic boundaries. The result was a white supremacy under threat and predicated on climate, 
homogenous labor, and a white body politic. Regardless of the ultimate role race may have 
played in the debate’s outcome, it thoroughly suffused that debate and was a valuable political 
tool for all involved. By investigating the politics of race rather than relegating them to the 
periphery of annexation studies, historians can better understand not only annexation but 
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